



FORMER ENEMIES MAY SUE IN COURT OF CLAIMS TO
RECOVER VALUE OF PROPERTY UNLAWFULLY
VESTED BY ALIEN PROPERTY CUSTODIAN
Sometime after January 1, 1947, plaintiffs, citizens and residents of
Germany at all times here pertinent, acquired equitable interests in deposits
and negotiable securities held in two New York City banks by a Costa
Rican corporation. On July 26, 1951, the Alien Property Custodian seized
the deposits and securities and subsequently turned them over to the United
States. The corporate and individual owners brought suit against the
United States in the Court of Claims to recover the value of the property,
alleging that in light of a letter from the President to the Vice-President
on July 9, 1951,1 the seizure was illegal. This letter requested the Vice-
President to lay before Congress for its consideration an accompanying
draft of a proposed joint resolution to terminate the war with Germany.2 It
stated, inter alia, that the "vesting of German property . . . does not
extend to property acquired since the resumption of trade with Germany
on January 1, 1947."3 The defendant moved to dismiss, contending
that suits by the individual plaintiffs, as admitted enemies of the United
States at the time the property was vested, were barred by sections 7(c) (4)
and 9(a) of the Trading With the Enemy Act.4 The court found that
the President's letter proved the taking unlawful and that, while the
Trading With the Enemy Act in most cases forbade suit by enemies and
former enemies, it did not bar former enemies from claiming compensation
for invalidly vested property. The court then denied defendant's motion,
1. 97 CoNG. Rc. 7762-64 (1951).
2. Id. at 7763-64. The war with Germany was officially terminated on October 19,
1951.65 STAT. 451 (1951).
3. 97 CONG. REC. 7763 (1951).
4. Trading with the Enemy Act, 40 STAT. 416, 419 (1917), as amended, 50 U.S.C.
App. §§ 7(c) (4), 9(a) (1952) (hereinafter cited by U.S.C. section number only).
Section 7(c) (4) provides: "The sole relief and remedy of any person having any
claim to any money or property ... seized by [the Alien Property Custodian] shall
be that provided by the terms of this Act. .. ." Section 9(a) provides: "Any person
not an enemy or ally of enemy claiming any interest, right, or title in any money or
other property which may have been . . . seized by [the Alien Property Custodian]
hereunder and held by him or by the Treasurer of the United States may file with
the said custodian a notice of his claim . .. [and] may institute a suit in equity in
the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia or in the district court of the United
States for the district in which such claimant resides ... to establish the interest,
right, title, or debt so claimed, and if so established the court shall order the . . . de-
livery to said claimant of the money or other property so held .. . or the interest
therein to which the court shall determine said claimant is entitled."
(1054)
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taking jurisdiction of the case as one "founded upon [an] Act of Con-
gress." 5 Gmo. Niehaus & Co. v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 428 (Ct. Cl.
1957).
Although the government constitutionally may confiscate enemy
property located within the United States during wartime,6 the leading case
of Brown v. United States 7 established that the Executive must have con-
gressional authorization for such seizures. Brown implied that the need
for authorization was restricted to seizures of enemy property located
within the country at the start of the war,8 but later courts apparently have
extended this requirement to property acquired in the United States sub-
sequent to the commencement of hostilities.9 In the instant case Congress
by the Trading With the Enemy Act had authorized the President to
appoint an Alien Property Custodian to vest enemy property "when, as,
and upon the terms directed by the President .... " 10 Pursuant to this
act, the President by executive order established the Office of Alien
Property Custodian to "take such action as he deems necessary in the
national interest, including but not limited to, the power to . . . vest
. . . property or interest within the United States of any nature whatso-
ever owned or controlled by . . . a designated enemy or national there-
of." ' Plaintiffs contended that the presidential letter quoted above suffi-
ciently established that the President had withdrawn the Custodian's au-
thority to vest German property brought into the country after December
31, 1946, the date hostilities officially ceased,' 2 and that since plaintiff's
property fell within this category the seizure was illegal.' 3 Cases decided
prior to the passage of the Trading With the Enemy Act indicated that an
illegal seizure of enemy property by a government official would not operate
to transfer title to the United States.'4 Although an enemy had no access
to our courts during the war,'5 his substantive rights to the property were
5. Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (Supp. IV, 1956).
6. Cummings v. Deutsche Bank, 300 U.S. 115 (1937); United States v. Chemical
Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 11 (1926); Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U.S. 239 (1921);
Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. 268, 304-05 (1870).
7. 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814).
8. The Court's holding was based on the theory that property brought into the
country during peacetime, as distinguished from property brought in during the war,
was subject to the public faith and that war should not, therefore, automatically
empower the Executive to confiscate such property. Id. at 123.
9. See Silesian-American Corp. v. Clark, 332 U.S. 469, 475 (1947) ; The Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 711 (1900); Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (78 Wall.)
268 (1870).
10. § 5(b).
11. Exec. Order No. 9095, 7 FE. R G. 1971 (1942), as amended, Exec. Order
No. 9567, 10 Fim. Ri. 6917 (1945).
12. 3 C.F.Rt, 1943-48 Comp., 99 (1957).
13. Instant case at 429.
14. Conrad v. Waples, 96 U.S. 279 (1877); The Adventure, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch)
221, 228-29 (1814) ; Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814).
15. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 776-77 (1950); Ex parte Colonna,
314 U.S. 510 (1942).
1958]
1056 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 106
not extinguished.16 If at the conclusion of the war the confiscation had
not been validated by an authorized vesting order and the enemy could
find a waiver of sovereign immunity applicable to his claim,17 he could sue
for recovery of the confiscated property.18 Section 7(c) of the Trading
With the Enemy Act, however, provides that the "sole relief and remedy"
of one whose property had been seized is that "provided by the terms of this
act." 19 Section 9(a) then gives non-enemies the right to sue for recovery
of confiscated property in the United States district courts 2 0 and makes no
mention of any possible suits by former enemies or of suits in any court
other than the district court.21 Courts applying these sections have uni-
formly held that, since remedies were given only to non-enemies, suits by
claimants seeking recovery of seized property would not be entertained
once it was determined that they were enemies within the meaning of the
act when the property was confiscated.m To recover the value of the
property in question in the Court of Claims, therefore, the plaintiffs
needed to convince the court that the seizure was illegal; that the limitation
by sections 7 (c) and 9(a) of remedies to non-enemies was not applicable
where the seizure was illegal; that the Trading With the Enemy Act does
not alter existing law as to illegal seizures of enemy property; and that the
United States had consented to be sued in the Court of Claims.
Assuming that the seizure was illegal, the Trading With the Enemy
Act would still seem to preclude suit against the United States by former
enemies, but the instant court, purporting to give a "humane" interpreta-
tion to the statute, construed sections 7(c) and 9(a) as limiting jurisdiction
only in cases where the property had been "lawfully taken" and the
16. Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 532, 537 (1867) ; The Adventure, 12
U.S. (8 Cranch) 221, 228-29 (1814). Farbenfabriken Bayer A. G. v. Sterling Drug,
Inc., 251 F.2d 300 (3rd Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 26 U.S.L. Week 3333 (U.S. May 20,
1958) (No. 886), involved a former enemy alien corporation which brought suit in
1955 on a chose in action that was subject to vesting but had not been vested by the
Alien Property Custodian. The court stated, at 303, that although war had suspended
plaintiffs' right to sue "the disability caused by the suspension was a personal one.
• . . It was not a substantive failure of the causes of action."
17. United States v. Alabama, 313 U.S. 274, 281 (1941) ; United States v. Michel,
282 U.S. 656 (1931) ; Bigby v. United States, 188 U.S. 400 (1903) ; Carr v. United
States, 98 U.S. 433 (1878).
18. See cases cited note 16 supra.
19. See note 4 supra.
20. Both parties conceded that as admitted former enemies the individual plain-
tiffs could not sue in the district court. Instant case at 429.
21. See note 4 supra. Since § 9(a) refers only to property seized "hereunder," i.e.,
under the terms of the act, it would not standing alone appear to withdraw judicial
remedies otherwise available to persons whose property had been illegally seized by
the Alien Property Custodian. Section 7(c) (4), however, which speaks of "any
claim" to "any property" seized by the Custodian, and § 9(f), which says that "except
as herein provided, the money or other property conveyed ... to the Alien Property
Custodian, shall not be ... subject to any order or decree of any court," would seem
to remove any ambiguity existing in § 9 (a).
22. Hansen v. Brownell, 234 F.2d 60 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Cordero v. Brownell, 211
F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1954) ; Uebersee Finanz-Korporation v. Brownell, 133 F. Supp. 615
(D.D.C. 1955); Public Adm'r v. McGrath, 104 F. Supp. 834 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); cf.
Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korporation, 332 U.S. 480 (1947).
23. See text at notes 19, 21 supra.
RECENT CASES
plaintiff is an enemy or ally of an enemy 24  The court then concluded,
without further discussing the act, that the Trading With the Enemy Act
did not alter existing law on the illegal seizure of enemy property and,
therefore, since his seizure was unlawful the former enemy plaintiffs did
not lose their substantive rights to the property.2 The court found con-
gressional consent to be sued by an enemy whose property had been
illegally seized in the section of the Tucker Act 2 6 which grants jurisdiction
to the Court of Claims in cases "founded upon any Act of Congress."27
For a case to be "founded upon any Act of Congress," the statute on
which the plaintiff bases his claim against the United States need not
specifically provide a remedy for him; it is sufficient if it can be interpreted
as recognizing a right in the plaintiff and does not provide any other ex-
clusive remedy for enforcing the right.28 It has been held, therefore, that
when a federal agent purporting to act under a federal statute takes money
from a person and turns it over to the United States, that person may sue
for its return in the District Court, if it does not exceed $10,000,29 or in the
Court of Claims.30 The instant court rested its jurisdictional holding on
the theory of these cases,3 although, unlike the instant case, they did not
involve a statute which appeared to limit all remedies to those provided by
the terms of the act 32 The Court of Claims and the Supreme Court have
sometimes concluded that a statute has spelled out a remedy excluding the
jurisdiction of the Court of Claims with language less explicit than that of
the Trading With the Enemy Act.P These statutes, however, did provide
some form of administrative remedy to the plaintiffs,3 4 while if the instant
court held that the act's remedies were exclusive as to these admittedly
former enemy plaintiffs, they would be without judicial relief under sec-
24. Instant case at 430.
25. Id. at 430-32. Legislative history of the Trading With the Enemy Act sheds
no light on whether Congress intended to alter existing law on illegal seizures of
enemy property. See 55 CONG. RIZc. 4840-79 (1917); 87 CONG. Rc. 9837-38, 9855-68
(1941).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (Supp. IV, 1956).
27. Instant case at 432.
28. United States v. Hvoslef, 237 U.S. 1 (1915); Dooley v. United States, 182
U.S. 222 (1901); Aycock-Lindsey Corp. v. United States, 171 F.2d 518 (5th Cir.
1948); United States v. Ohio Oil Co., 163 F.2d 633 (10th Cir. 1947); Compagnie
General Transatlantique v. United States, 21 F.2d 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1927); New York
Cent. R.R. v. United States, 65 Ct. Cl. 115, 122 (1928), aff'd, 279 U.S. 73 (1929);
see Morse, The Jurisdiction of the Court of Clains and Claims of International Import,
1957 Wis. L. Rxv. 222, 236-39; Developments in the Law-Remedies Agahst the
United States and Its Officials, 70 HARv. L. Rzv. 827, 882-84 (1957).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (a) (2) (1952) ; see note 20 supra.
30. Carriso, Inc. v. United States, 106 F2d 707 (9th Cir. 1939); Ross Packing
Co. v. United States, 42 F. Supp. 932 (E.D. Wash. 1942); Clapp v. United States,
127 Ct. Cl. 505, 117 F. Supp. 576, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 834 (1954).
31. Instant case at 432.
32. See cases cited note 30 supra.
33. Williamsport Wire Rope Co. v. United States, 277 U.S. 551 (1928); United
States v. Babcock, 250 U.S. 328 (1919) ; Montgomery Ward & Co. v. United States,
94 Ct. Cl. 309 (1941).
34. Ibid.
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tion 9(a) 5 and without administrative relief by section 32(a) which denies
administrative remedies to World War II German enemies.8 8 Although
impliedly admitting that enemies whose property has been lawfully seized
are barred from suit or administrative relief, the instant court in effect said
that it would not conclude that the United States had declined permission
to be sued by a small class of plaintiffs to whom the statutory limitation
was not unquestionably pointed. This construction of the Trading With
the Enemy Act seems to be in line with the trend toward restricting the
doctrine of sovereign immunity.8 7 The court's decision, furthermore, does
not conflict with the twofold purpose of the vesting provisions of the
Trading With the Enemy Act.3 8 It does not violate the purpose of pre-
venting enemies from using their property against the United States during
the war, 9 as these plaintiffs did not acquire their property interests until
after hostilities had ceased. 4° Nor does it run counter to the other objective
of enabling the United States to use enemy property for its own purposes,41
since before these plaintiffs obtained an interest in the property in question,
the United States had embarked on a program of encouraging trade with
Germany. 42 Citizens of Germany would be reluctant to engage in com-
mercial relations with the United States if property brought into this coun-
try in the course of trade were subject to the vesting power of the govern-
ment. By an imaginative interpretation of the complex language of the
Trading With the Enemy Act, the court prevented a wartime act from
obstructing a peacetime program. Finally, assuming the seizure to be
illegal, a contrary decision would have raised serious questions of the
scope of the fifth amendment's protection of property rights. Although the
court spoke only of the unfairness of denying relief to the plaintiffs, 43 a
35. See text and notes at notes 20-22 supra.
36. Section 32(a) provides: "The President . . . may return any property or
interest vested in ... the Alien Property Custodian . .. whenever the President ...
shall determine . .. (2) that such owner [the owner immediately prior to the vesting],
and legal representative or successor in interest, if any, are not .. . (D) an individual
who was at any time after December 7, 1941, a citizen or subject of Germany ... and
who on or after December 7, 1941, and prior to the date of the enactment of this
section [March 8, 1946], was present . . . in the territory of such nation. .. ."
37. A significant legislative relaxation of sovereign immunity occurred with the
enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act, Act of Aug. 2, 1946, c. 753, 60 STAT. 842
(codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). In National City Bank v. Republic of
China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955), the Court said at 359: "But even the immunity enjoyed
by the United States as territorial soveregn is a legal doctrine that has not been
favored by the test of time. It has increasingly been found to be in conflict with the
growing subjection of governmental action to the moral judgment." See Kiefer &
Kiefer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U.S. 381 (1939). But see Larson v.
Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 703-04 (1949).
38. See Bishop, Judicial Construction of the Trading With the Enemy Act, 62
H av. L. Ryv. 721-23 (1949).
39. Koehler v. Clark, 170 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1948) ; Standard Oil Co. v. Markham,
64 F. Supp. 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), modified on other grounds, 163 F.2d 917 (2d C'r.
1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 873 (1948).
40. See text at notes 1, 12 supra.
41. State of the Netherlands v. Federal Reserve Bank, 99 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y.
1951), aff'd in part and reV'd in part on other grounds, 201 F.2d 455 (2d Cir. 1953);
Clark v. Continental Nat'l Bank, 88 F. Supp. 324 (D. Neb. 1949); In re Heubach's
Will, 134 N.Y.S.2d 169 (Surr. Ct. 1954).
42. 97 CoNo. Rrc. 7762-64 (1951).
43. Instant case at 430.
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holding for defendant would have amounted to a denial of relief for an un-
authorized confiscation of the property. This is so since once determined
to be enemies within the meaning of the Trading With the Enemy Act the
plaintiffs, by the terms of that act, would have no other judicial 4 or ad-
ministrative remedy.4 The question then would have arisen whether
non-resident aliens who were enemies at the time of the action complained
of are within the purview of the constitutional mandate that property can-
not be taken without due process of law.46
The instant court, in holding sufficient plaintiffs' allegations that the
confiscation of their property was illegal, found that the presidential
letter established that the Alien Property Custodian's authority to seize the
property in question had been withdrawn.47  With certain exceptions not
here pertinent all presidential proclamations and executive orders are re-
quired to be published in the Federal Register.48 The purpose of this re-
quirement is to notify the general public of any action taken by the Presi-
dent under powers granted to him by Congress. 49  Once published in the
Register a regulation has the force of law. 0 The instant court held, how-
44. See text and notes at notes 19-22 .rupra.
45. See text and note at note 36 supra.
46. The Supreme Court has declared that friendly aliens are protected by the
fifth amendment requirement of just compensation for private property taken for
public use. Guessefeldt v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 308, 318 (1952); Russian Volunteer
Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 489 (1931).
47. Instant case at 432. The court's opinion is susceptible of the interpretation
that the presidential letter was conclusive proof that the Custodian's authority over
plaintiffs' property had been withdrawn. It said, at 432: "The statement was a state-
ment by the President of the United States, the official primarily responsible for the
conduct of our relations with other countries, the official to whom Congress had
delegated the power to determine when and on what terms alien property should be
seized. If the President and his legal advisors did not know what he had determined,
some years before, should be liable to vesting, and what property should not be so
liable, his agents should have, in the several intervening years, acquired the same
information.
'We are not willing to decide that the plaintiffs' property, at the time and in the
circumstances alleged in the petition, was subject to lawful vesting, in the face of the
statement of the President of the United States, to whom Congress had delegated
the power referred to above [to seize enemy property], that it was not so subject."
But see Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. MacArthur Mining Co., 184 F.2d 913 (8th
Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 943 (1951) (evidence insufficient to rebut presump-
tion that presidential policy statement created no private contractual rights).
48. 49 STAT. 501 (1935), as amended, 44 U.S.C. § 305 (Supp. IV, 1957). This
section requires publication in the Register of all executive proclamations and orders
"except such as have no general applicability and legal effect or are effective only
against Federal agencies or persons in their capacity as officers, agents or employees
thereof ... " Courts have interpreted the section to mean that orders directed to-
ward "one certain property or individual" or intended to regulate the "internal admini-
stration" of federal agencies are not required to be published in the Register. Toledo,
P. & W. R.R. v. Stover, 60 F. Supp. 587 (D. Ili. 1945) ; United States v. Birnbaum,
55 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1944). Documents of general applicability and future
effect published in the Federal Register are currently codified in the 1949 edition (with
revisions and cumulative annual supplement) of the Com op FEDMAL RGULATIONS.
49. Toledo, P. & W. R.R. v. Stover, 60 F. Supp. 587 (D. Ill. 1945).
50. Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Co. v. Krug, 172 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1949), ree'd
on other grounds sub nom. Chapman v. Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Co., 338 U.S. 621
(1950) ; United States v. Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 107 F. Supp. 753 (W.D.
Mo.), aff'd, 207 F2d 935 (8th Cir. 1952).
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ever, that an executive order so published 51 may be partially superseded by a
presidential letter published only in the Congressional Record. Though the
letter was not used to impose any new liabilities on the public, if this hold-
ing is followed, congressional policy may still be undermined. Not only
would it be more difficult for the public to ascertain the nature of the
rights that had been granted to them by the Executive, but the President
might also find that statements which he did not intend to have any legal
effect were being used by the courts to determine private rights. Arguably
the language of the presidential letter in the instant case, though not in the
form of a directive to anyone, would admit of only one interpretation-
that the President had decided some years before that property acquired
after January 1, 1947 was not subject to vesting by the Alien Property
Custodian. Further, the President's statement was part of a carefully
drafted message to Congress requesting passage of an important piece of
legislation,5 2 so there was no doubt that it was intended to reflect the Cus-
todian's authority. This relaxation of the Federal Register requirements,
however, may lead to problems when a statement made with less formality
and clarity is involved. The risk of misconstruction by the courts of the
presidential intent and the burden on litigants to investigate beyond the
Register to determine the status of an executive order would seem
substantial.
Constitutional Law-
STATE DENIAL OF PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTION TO
ADVOCATES OF VIOLENT OVERTHROW AND
CONSEQUENT LOYALTY OATH REQUIREMENT
HELD CONSTITUTIONAL AND NOT SUPERSEDED
BY FEDERAL LEGISLATION
An amendment to the California constitution in 1952 provided that
"no person or organization which advocates the overthrow of the Gov-
ernment of the United States or the State by force or violence . . .
shall . . . receive any exemption from any tax imposed by this State or
any . . . political subdivision... ., 1 With the expressed intent of
effectuating the purpose of this constitutional provision, the California
legislature, in 1953, added to the Revenue and Taxation Code a new
section which provided that
"any . . . return . . . in which is claimed any exemption
. from any property tax imposed by this State . . . shall con-
51. Exec. Order No. 9095, 7 FtD. R. 1971 (1942), as amended, Exec. Order No.
9567, 10 FFD. REG. 6917 (1945).
52. See 97 CoNG. Rix. 7762-64 (1951).
1. CAL. CoNsr. art. XX, § 19(b).
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tain a declaration that the person or organization making the . . .
return . . . does not advocate the overthrow of the Government of
the United States or of the State of California by force or violence.
Failure to include this declaration in the return rendered the appli-
cant ineligible for the tax exemption 3 Plaintiff church filed a return with
the county tax assessor applying for the church property tax exemption,4
but refused to sign the non-subversive oath. The church property was then
assessed as non-exempt property and plaintiff paid the tax under protest.
In plaintiff's action for recovery of the taxes paid, defendant's general de-
murrer was sustained. The California Supreme Court affirmed by a
divided court (4-3), holding, inter alia, that neither the constitutional pro-
vision nor the statutory oath requirement infringed upon rights guaran-
teed to plaintiff under the fourteenth amendment of the Federal Constitu-
tion. The court also held that neither of these enactments was superseded
by federal sedition legislation, since supersession is limited to statutes
imposing criminal penalties. First Unitarian Church v. County of Los An-
geles, 48 Cal. 2d 419, 311 P.2d 508, cert. granted, 355 U.S. 583 (1957). 5
The California constitutional provision denied a tax exemption to
those who "advocate" violent overthrow of the government.6 Although
the instant court might have construed the denial of the tax exemption
as applying only to those who "advocate to action," no such narrow
construction of this provision seems to have been made. In view of the
decisions in Dennis v. United States7 and Yates v. United States,8
"advocacy to action" is apparently the only type of subversive "advocacy" 9
2. CAL. Gr*N. LAws ANN. tit. 59, § 32 (West 1956).
3. Ibid. The statute also makes it a felony to make "such declaration knowing
it to be false."
4. CAL. CoNsT. art. XIII, § 1Y2. Under California law, returns must be filed
even if the property is claimed to be wholly exempt from taxation. CAL. G N. LAWS
ANN. tit. 59, § 254 (West 1956).
5. Decided by the California Supreme Court and now before the United States
Supreme Court together with the following companion cases: Speiser v. Randall, 48
Cal. 2d 903, 311 P.2d 546, probable jurisdiction nwted, 355 U.S. 880 (1957); First
Methodist Church v. Horstmann, 48 Cal. 2d 901, 311 P.2d 542 (1957), appeal
docketed, 26 U.S.L. WSzI 3131 (U.S. Sept. 19, 1957) (No. 485); People's Church
v. County of Los Angeles, 48 Cal. 2d 899, 311 P.2d 540, cert. granted, 355 U.S. 854
(1957) ; Prince v. San Francisco, 48 Cal. 2d 472, 311 P2d 544, probable jurisdiction
noted, 355 U.S. 880 (1957).
6. See text at note 1 supra, note 27 infra.
7. 341 U.S. 494 (1951). For exhaustive discussion of the Dennis decision see
Corwin, Bowing Out "Clear and Present Danger," 27 Nom DAMS LAW. 325 (1952),
and Lusk, The Present Status of the "Clear and Present Danger Test"-A Brief
History and Some Observations, 45 Ky. L.J. 576 (1957). For severe criticism of the
Dennis decision see Antieau, Dennis v. United States-Precedent, Principle or Perver-
sion?, 5 VANm. L. Rxv. 141 (1952).
8. 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
9. Exclusive of any actual attempt to violently overthrow the existing form of
government, the activities of a proponent of violent overthrow of the government
can take on various forms; first, there can be mere belief or desire that such a course
of action be undertaken; second, there can be various theoretical and philosophical
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which can be made criminal and still be compatible with the constitutionally
protected freedom of speech.10 Yet the guarantees of the first amendment,
as made applicable to the states by the fourteenth," are not confined to laws
penal in form; 12 they apply also to taxes.'8 For some purposes, however,
the government may classify individuals on the basis of whether or not they
"advocate" (as opposed to "advocate to action") violent overthrow. Thus,
the Supreme Court has upheld such legislative classifications and loyalty
oath requirements when applied to candidates for public office, 14 municipal
employees,' 8 public school teachers,' 6 and officers of labor unions seeking
to utilize the services of the NLRB.1 But in all of these cases there has
been involved a "governmental interest" beyond the basic interest of pro-
tecting itself against violent overthrow, such as an interest in the fitness of
its present or prospective "employees" 18 or an interest in preventing tie-ups
discussions of the desirability of violent overthrow; then there can be actual advocacy
of the abstract doctrine of violent overthrow; and, finally, there can be advocacy of
the necessity of violent overthrow through the use of language tending to incite the
audience to action to achieve the desired result. It is this latter stage of activity
which the Dennis case held could constitutionally be made criminal by the federal
government, and which the Yates case apparently held to be the minimum amount of
subversive activity for which the federal government could constitutionally imprison
a proponent of violent overthrow. See note 10 infra.
10. The actual decision in the Yates case was that the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C.
§2385 (1952), did not proscribe "advocacy" in its broad sense, but that it only pun-
ished "advocacy to action." Although the Court outwardly rested its decision on
grounds of statutory interpretation rather than "constitutional compulsion" (354 U.S.
at 319), the conclusion is inescapable that, by construing the act in such a manner,
the Court has established a minimum of "advocacy" necessary in order to constitu-
tionally punish seditious speech. The Smith Act itself merely speaks to "advocacy,"
not "advocacy to action." So too, in explaining its reason for placing such a construc-
tion on the act, the Court refers to "a constitutional danger zone so clearly marked"
that it would be improbable to suppose that Congress intended to ignore it. 354 U.S.
at 319.
11. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S.
353 (1937) ; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652, 666 (1928) (dictum).
12. Even the words of the first amendment convey this thought; there shall be
"no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech. . . ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. See
Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146
(1946); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105 (1943). "[Ilndirect 'discouragements' undoubtedly have the same coercive
effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights as imprisonment, fines, injunc-
tions or taxes. A requirement that adherents of particular religious faiths or political
parties wear identifying arm-bands, for example, is obviously of this nature." Amer-
ican Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950) (dictum). Cf. Bryant
v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928). For a recent discussion of other problems in
this area see Comment, State Control Over Political Organizations: First Amend-
ment Chiecks on Powers of Regulation, 66 YA4 LJ. 544 (1957).
13. Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Murdock v. Penn-
sylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) ; Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943) ; Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
14. Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 341 U.S. 56 (1951).
15. Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
16. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
17. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
18. See cases cited notes 14-16 supra.
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of interstate commerce due to political strikes engineered by subversive
union leaders.19 Affirmance of such classifications and oath requirements
has rested upon finding such "governmental interest." 20 Thus, in Garner v.
Board of Pub. Works 21 the Court stated that a "municipal employer is
not disabled because it is an agency of the State from inquiring of its em-
ployees as to matters that may prove relevant to their fitness and suit-
ability for the public service." 22
Since a tax has the same tendency to abridge first amendment free-
doms as does criminal punishment, and the denial of an exemption is
the equivalent of a direct tax, it would seem that the instant tax classifica-
tion must, in light of the Yates decision, be deemed an unconstitutional in-
fringement upon free speech, unless some sufficient "governmental interest,"
beyond the basic interest of protecting itself against violent overthrow,
can be found. No such interest is present here; 24 indeed, the California
Supreme Court recognized that the real reason for the tax classification
was "the interest of the state in maintaining the loyalty of its people and
thus safeguarding against its violent overthrow," 25 an interest which is
present in every instance of classification on the basis of "advocacy" and
"non-advocacy." 26 Thus, the denial of the tax exemption involved herein
would appear to be violative of the fourteenth amendment.
If the tax classification be deemed not to violate first amendment
freedoms-either by construing the California constitutional provision as
applying only to those who "advocate to action," 2 7 or by viewing the Yates
holding as merely a matter of statutory interpretation 28 so that punish-
19. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
20. Recently, the Supreme Court intimated, without so holding, that a state may
constitutionally deny admission to the bar to those who "advocate" violent overthrow.
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957) ; Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,
353 U.S. 232 (1957). Here too there would seem to be sufficient "governmental
interest" in light of the important position of attorneys in society and their status as
"officers of the court." For a recent discussion of other important aspects in these
decisions see 106 U. PA. L. Ri. 753 (1958). For a collection of loyalty oath cases
considered by both federal and state courts see Annot. 18 A.L.R. 2d 268 (1951).
21. 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
22. Id. at 720.
23. See note 10 supra.
24. Even if the denial of the exemption is rationalized as being merely a with-
holding of financial encouragement from subversives, there is no escape from the
fact that such encouragement is denied solely in order to reduce the effectiveness of
attempts to overthrow the government, and lessen the danger of its accomplishment.
25. Instant case at 438, 311 P.2d at 520.
26. See text at notes 18-20 supra.
27. Since the Yates case was not decided until after the decision in the instant
case, the California Supreme Court was obviously unaware of the necessity of
narrowly construing the word "advocacy" and did not deal with this problem. It
would appear, therefore, that the "advocacy" referred to in the California constitu-
tional provision must be taken in its normal and literal sense, and not in the sense of
"advocacy to action," even though, if this were a federal statute, it would be construed
as meaning "advocacy to action" as was done in the Yates case. See note 10 supra.
28. See note 10 supra.
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ment of "advocacy" even without incitement to action is therefore con-
stitutionally permissible-the additional requirement of an oath to enforce
this classification does not infringe upon any constitutional guarantees.
It may be conceded that, since affirmance of loyalty oath requirements in
other Supreme Court cases has always rested upon a finding of some
sufficient "governmental interest" beyond that of merely protecting itself
against violent overthrow,2 9 a government could not, under threat of penal-
ties for refusal to answer, require each member of its general populace
to sign a loyalty oath. But if a government is permitted to grant certain
tax exemptions, it must also be permitted to require those claiming such
exemptions to support in some manner their claim to eligibility for them.
What appears to be the simplest way to substantiate such a claim in the
first instance is to require the claimant to sign an oath or declaration to
the effect that he is eligible for the exemption. There is nothing unusual or
remarkable about such a requirement; it is quite common. This is the
procedure used in the instant case. If plaintiff is within the eligible cate-
gory and desires the exemption it must support its claim by filing the
oath; if it is not entitled to the exemption it need not do so. The sanction,
if denial of the exemption be viewed as such, is imposed not for failure to
file the oath, but for failure to establish eligibility. There appears to be no
valid reason for preventing California from utilizing means which are rea-
sonably necessary for effective enforcement of a valid tax classification.30
However, even if the tax classification were otherwise unobjectionable,
it appears that there has been an improper exercise of state authority in an
area which is now exclusively regulated by the federal government. In
Pennsylvania v. Nelson 31 the Supreme Court decided that federal sedition
legislation had superseded a state statute which made it a crime to ad-
vocate the violent overthrow of the United States.32  The Court said:
29. See text at notes 18-20 supra.
30. Plaintiff also contends that it has been deprived of a constitutionally pro-
tected freedom of religion. This contention seems unfounded. There is no more
reason to permit advocacy of violent overthrow of government in the name of
religion than to permit bigamy or polygamy, which can constitutionally be made
criminal even though espoused by a church. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890);
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). Nor does the oath requirement violate
freedom of religion. The fact that plaintiff's officers subscribed oaths upon the filing
of both the affidavit with the claim for exemption and the complaint in the instant
case indicates that the taking of an oath does not violate plaintiff's religious tenets.
See instant case at 437, 311 P2d at 518-19. Finally, the claim that freedom of
religion prevents government from compelling it to reveal anything about that which
it advocates cannot be accepted. The universal proselytizing practiced by religious
organizations reveals the tenuous nature of such a claim. Moreover, the interference
with religious activities resulting from compliance with the instant oath requirement
is no more prohibitive of the free exercise of religion than is that resulting from
compliance with public education laws, municipal fire and safety ordinances, and
public health laws. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) ; Everson v. Board
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) ; cf. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
31. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
32. Although the state statute also proscribed sedition against the state govern-
ment, the only question before the Court in Nelson was whether there had been
supersession as to sedition against the federal government.
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"Looking to all of them [federal sedition statutes] in the aggre-
gate, the conclusion is inescapable that Congress has intended to
occupy the field of sedition. Taken as a whole they evince a con-
gressional plan which makes it reasonable to determine that no room
has been left for the States to supplement it . . . [Congress has]
proscribed sedition against all government in the nation-national,
state and local. . . Congress having thus treated seditious conduct
as a matter of vital national concern, it is in no sense a local enforce-
ment problem." -3
Although the court in the Nelson case was dealing with a criminal
statute, the implication of the Court's statements and holding is that fed-
eral legislation has superseded enforcement of all state enactments punish-
ing sedition against the United States.3 4 It should not be considered any
less a punishment when effectuated by denial of a tax exemption rather
than by criminal sanctionso In concluding that the enactments involved
in the instant case had not been superseded, the California Supreme Court
relied heavily on the fact that Slochower z. Board of Higher Educ.,86
which was decided one week after the Nelson case, cited with approval the
Adler3 7 and Garner3 s decisions in which loyalty oaths were upheld. But
these two cases involved governmental inquiry into the fitness of its em-
ployees for public service and did not involve use of the government's power
qua government (rather than qua employer) as a sanction against seditious
conduct. It would appear that use of governmental powers to punish for
sedition against the United States can be had only at the federal level and,
since the instant enactments punish sedition against the United States,
enforcement of the tax classification may not be had.3 9
33. 350 U.S. at 504-05.
34. Even though the language of the Court is sufficient to infer supersession even
as to state law which proscribes sedition against only the state government, it must
be borne in mind that the holding of the Court was that there had been supersession
where the state statute proscribed sedition against the federal government. See note
32 supra. There is no clear-cut statement in the opinion that the same result would
not be reached where state law proscribes only seditious conduct against the state
government, although the Court does state that "the decision in this case does not
. . . limit the right of the state to protect itself at any time against sabotage or
attempted violence of all kinds." 350 U.S. at 500. This statement might be interpreted
as permitting a state to proscribe advocacy of its violent overthrow, but it might also
be interpreted to mean that the state can punish action although it cannot punish
advocacy.
35. See text at note 13 supra.
36. 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
37. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
38. Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
39. Even if a state can punish advocacy of its violent overthrow (see notes 10
and 34 supra), the fact that the California enactments punish advocacy of violent
overthrow of either the state or federal government (see text at note 1 supra)
necessitates this conclusion, since the exemption has been denied because of failure to
disavow advocacy of violent overthrow of both state and federal governments.
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Judicial Review-
SUPREME COURT WILL GRANT CERTIORARI TO
REMAND CASE FOR DETERMINATION OF AN
ISSUE NOT PROPERLY RAISED IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS
Defendant, Acting Director of the Office of Rent Stabilization,' issued
a press release outlining his intention to suspend the plaintiffs, his sub-
ordinates, for using his name to support an unpopular terminal-leave plan
pending before Congress. In the ensuing libel action, the district court
rejected the defenses of absolute and qualified priilege and rendered
judgment for plaintiffs. In order to avoid the risk of a new trial which
might result in a larger damage award,2 defendant on appeal presented in
his brief only the question of absolute privilege, but during the proceedings
urged the defense of qualified privilege. The court of appeals ruled 3 that
the latter defense had been waived by defendant's failure to comply with
the court's rule requiring all issues to be presented in the brief,4 and
affirmed the judgment of the lower court on the ground of absolute privilege.
After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court declined to render a decision
which it felt would be beyond "the obvious requirements of the record" 5
and instead remanded the case to the court of appeals for a ruling on the
narrower ground of qualified privilege. Barr v. Matteo, 355 U.S. 171
(1957).
Review by the Supreme Court on certiorari is not a right of the
litigants, but rather a matter of the discretion of the Court. In exercising
this discretion the Court has followed the policy of selecting for review
only "those cases which present questions whose resolution will have
immediate importance far beyond the particular facts involved." 6 Since
reasons for a denial of certiorari are rarely given, the precise factors which
determine whether a case is sufficiently important to merit review are
difficult to ascertain. Some of these factors are set forth in rule 38(5) of
the Court; 7 others may be found in the writings of the justices,8 and in
opinions on the merits in cases in which certiorari has been granted. On
1. The Office of Rent Stabilization was formerly part of the Economic Stabiliza-
tion Agency. The Office was abolished in 1953 and its functions transferred to the
Department of Defense Mobilization. The ESA was an independent office subject to
the direction of the Director of Defense Mobilization who in turn was a member of
the Executive Office of the President.
2. Petition for Certiorari for Appellant, p. 7, instant case.
3. Barr v. Matteo, 244 F.2d 767 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
4. D.C. CIm. RuLEs 17(c) (7), (i) ; see text and note at note 30 in! ra.
5. Instant case at 172.
6. Vinson, Work of the Federal Courts, 69 Sup. Ct. v, vi (1949).
7. Among the cases for which the Court will look are those "where the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has decided a question of
general importance ... ." Sup. CT. RULE 38(5) Cc).
8. See note 6 supra. See also the opinion of Justice Frankfurter denying certi-
orari in Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912 (1950).
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the other hand, various categories of issues have been developed which the
Court will avoid reviewing. Some questions will not be considered because
their nature is political, 9 or because they require the exercise of judgment
better left to the legislature.10 Others will be avoided because they are
premature 11 or moot.'2 The Court also attempts to avoid making con-
stitutional decisions unnecessarily, since such decisions tend to undermine
the doctrine of separation of powers when an act of Congress is involved
and cannot be changed except by the Court itself.'- In many cases, how-
ever, the Court has refused to decide a question which, under the an-
nounced factors, appears to have been sufficiently important to merit
consideration. 14 The instant case is an example. In this case, however, the
Court avoided 15 deciding the question, not by denying certiorari, but by
granting it for the purpose of remanding to the court of appeals for
disposition on an issue not properly raised in that court.
The instant case appears neither more nor less important, or difficult,
than many others in which certiorari has been denied. The nature of the
precise question involved, however, suggests an explanation for the Court's
unique treatment. In defamation actions against public officials two distinct
privileges may be raised as defenses. One is that of absolute privilege,
which protects the official from liability for defamatory statements without
regard to motive or reasonableness. 16 Under federal law, this privilege
attaches to all statements made by judges, legislators, and executive officers
of cabinet rank relevant to the performance of their office. 17 The privilege
has been held to extend to lower officials as to communications which the
duties of their office require them to make. Thus it has been held that the
official reports of a consul to his superior relating to the reputation of an
individual doing business within the consul's district,' 8 the report of the
Chief of the Records and Pension Office to the Secretary of War charging
an applicant for a medal of honor with fraud, 19 a letter by a personnel
officer to the attorney of a former employee concerning the employee's
discharge,2 0 and the statement of a Civil Service Commissioner to a former
9. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
10. Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
11. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
12. United States v. Alaska S.S. Co., 253 U.S. 113 (1920).
13. See Barnett, Avoidanwe of Judicial Decisions Upon Constitutional Grounds
When Decision Can Be Based Upon Other Ground, 28 ORE. L. REV. 201 (1949);
Bernard, Avoidance of Constitutional Issues in the United States Supreme Court:
Liberties of the First Amendment, 50 MIcH. L. Rav. 261 (1951) ; Merritt Two Federal
Legislatures, 30 A.B.A.J. 379 (1944).
14. Harper & Rosenthal, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do in the 1949 Term
-An Appraisal of Certiorari, 99 U. PA. L. Rzv. 293, 323 (1950).
15. See note 29 infra.
16. PRossER, ToRTs § 95 (2d ed. 1955). For a more detailed analysis of the
absolute privilege of government officials see Note, 20 U. CHI. L. Rzv. 677 (1953).
17. PRossa, ToRts § 95 (2d ed. 1955).
18. United States v. Brunswick, 69 F.2d 383 (D.C. Cir. 1934).
19. De Arnaud v. Ainsworth, 24 App. D.C. 167 (1904).
20. Newbury v. Love, 242 F.2d 372 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
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employee seeking reinstatement 2' are absolutely privileged. All of these
cases have, however, involved vertical communications, i.e., those made to
superiors or subordinates. Few cases have involved horizontal communi-
cations, such as press releases. In Colpoys v. Gates, 2 absolute privilege
was held not to extend to a press release made by a United States marshal
concerning his deputies since the court found the press release was not
required by the duties of his office. Whether the privilege applies to press
releases made by officials ranking between the cabinet level 2 and the
level of a marshal has, prior to the instant case, been unlitigated.
Even without an absolute privilege, however, the official may receive
protection from the qualified privilege which extends to statements of any
member of the general public made in the public interest, or in the interest
of himself or others.2 4 This privilege, however, is limited to those state-
ments which the publisher has probable cause to believe are true, and
which, under the circumstances, are reasonable.2 Although such a privilege
is not dependent upon the holding of a particular office, the nature of the
publisher's office may determine whether a particular publication, such as a
press release, is reasonable.
Whether absolute privilege should be extended to press releases by
officials below cabinet rank is a difficult question. On the one hand, denial
of the privilege might impair the efficiency of such officials in the perform-
ance of their duties, because of both the inhibiting effect of fear of liability
and the time lost in defending suits.20  It would, moreover, inhibit the
free disclosure of information to the public. 27  These considerations have
led the courts to grant the privilege to cabinet officers,28 and they seem
applicable to some officials of lesser rank with nearly the same force. On
the other hand, the granting of such a privilege removes a check on
irresponsible action and makes vindication in open court of those defamed
impossible. Disposal of the case on the issue of qualified privilege does
not present such a difficult problem. The requirement of reasonableness
on the part of the publisher makes possible the granting of such a privilege
without fear of abuse through irresponsible action. At the same time, it
might well afford sufficient protection for the official. Since the question of
qualified privilege was not presented in defendant's petition for certiorari,
the Court was faced with the choice of deciding the difficult question of
21. Smith v. O'Brien, 88 F.2d 769 (D.C. Cir. 1937).
22. 118 F2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
23. It has been held that a press release by a cabinet member is absolutely privi-
leged. Glass v. Ickes, 117 F2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 718
(1941).
24. PRossma, ToRTs § 95 (2d ed. 1955).
25. Ibid. See also Campbell v. Willmark Serv. System, Inc., 123 F2d 204 (3d
Cir. 1941).
26. See 40 MicH. L. Rzv. 919 (1942).
27. Rourke, Law Enforcement Through Publicity, 24 U. CHI. L. Rzv. 225,
233 (1957) ; Note, 20 U. CHl. L. Rzv. 677, 679, 691 (1953).
28. See note 23 srupra.
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absolute privilege which might have proved unnecessary had it been able
to rule on the narrower issue, or of denying certiorari. This latter course
of action would have had the same inhibiting effect that a denial of the
privilege would entail since lesser officials would have no final determina-
tion on which to rely. By remanding for a ruling on the narrower issue,
this dilemma was avoided 9
The procedure adopted by the Court was undoubtedly useful in
effecting what seems a desirable disposition of the instant case. It does,
however, raise a question of the relationship of the Supreme Court to the
courts of appeals. Since the narrower issue had been deemed waived
under a validly adopted rule of the court below,8 0 the decision appears to
cast doubt either upon the efficacy of the particular rule here involved or
upon that of all procedural rules of the lower federal courts when the
operation of such rules conflicts with the Supreme Court's views on the
selection of issues for consideration. The Court did not discuss this
possible effect, although Justice Douglas, in dissenting, termed the action
"an unwarranted exercise" of the Court's supervisory powers.8 ' Although
the power granted the Court to "remand . . . and . . . require such
further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances
, . is undoubtedly broad enough to permit a countermanding of the
procedural rules of the courts of appeals, Justice Douglas's objection seems
well taken if such countermanding is to occur frequently. The fact that
comparatively few court of appeals cases reach the Supreme Court, how-
ever, makes it unlikely that the instant decision will have much impact on
the rules of the lower federal courts.
Of greater interest is the future use to which the Supreme Court will
put the technique devised in the instant case. If the Court grants certiorari
and remands the case for consideration of an issue not properly raised
before the lower court merely to avoid deciding a difficult question, as was
29. This avoidance, of course, may prove only temporary. If the court of appeals
determines that a government official of defendant's rank does not have a qualified
privilege, the question of absolute privilege is by definition determined. If, however,
the defense of qualified privilege is sustained by the court of appeals, a new trial in
the district court will be required. If that court finds that defendant has lost his
privilege by unreasonable publication, the question of the existence of absolute privi-
lege may again confront the Supreme Court, without the avenue of escape available
which the Court utilized in the instant case to avoid ruling on the issue.
30. Congress has by statute authorized all federal courts to prescribe rules for
the conduct of their business, subject to the condition that they must not be inconsist-
ent with Acts of Congress or rules of the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1952).
Pursuant to such statutory authority, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia adopted rules requiring that appellant's brief contain a concise statement
of the points on which he intends to rely. D.C. CiR. RuLz 17(c) (7). Rule 17(i)
of that court provides that points not so presented will be disregarded, but that the
court reserves the option of passing upon plain errors not pointed out or relied on.
The court of appeals in the instant case did not apply the plain error exception,
saying that "in the absence of extraordinary circumstances the exception should not
be applied, in a civil case, to a point that eminent counsel, for -strategic or other
reasons, have deliberately chosen to waive." Barr v. Matteo, 244 F.2d 767, 769 (D.C.
Cir. 1957).
31. Instant case at 174.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1952).
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done in the instant case, there would seem to be no justification for the
procedure. The issue more difficult of determination may often be the
issue which is more pressing for decision. If, on the other hand, it provides
a means of securing limited resolution of questions which would otherwise
be denied review, the procedure appears worthy of continued use.
Jurisdiction-
STATE COURT MAY GRANT SPECIFIC ENFORCEMENT
OF NO-STRIKE CLAUSE UNDER SECTION 301(a) OF
TAFT-HARTLEY ACT
Plaintiff employer brought suit in a state court to enjoin defendant
union from striking in breach of a collective bargaining agreement. The
complaint alleged that defendants had brought about a strike of plaintiff's
employees, although the agreement contained a no-strike clause and
provided for settlement of grievances by arbitration, and that the sole rea-
son given for the strike-that plaintiffs were labor contractors and were
violating state safety regulations-was without foundation. From an order
of the district court granting a preliminary injunction defendant appealed
on the grounds that the controversy involved an unfair labor practice and
was therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the state court. The District Court
of Appeal reversed.' The Supreme Court of California vacated the opinion
of the District Court of Appeal and affirmed the order of the district court,
holding that since the union's activities did not constitute an unfair labor
practice the state court was a competent forum and that neither section
301 (a) of the Taft-Hartley Act 2 nor the Norris-La Guardia Act 3 limit the
injunctive powers of the state courts. McCarroll v. Los Angeles Dist.
Council of Carpenters, 315 P.2d 322 (Cal. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
932 (1958).
Section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act provides:
"Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a
labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting
commerce . . . , or between any such labor organizations, may be
brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction
of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or with-
out regard to the citizenship of the parties." 4
Prior to 1957 the construction of this section was in doubt, and two
divergent lines of authority had developed. Some courts had favored a
1. 304 P.2d 781 (Cal. App. 1956).
2. 61 STAT. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1952).
3. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1952).
4. 61 STAT. 156 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1952).
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narrow construction which read the section merely as a grant of jurisdiction
to the federal district courts; 5 most, however, had found in the provision
authority to fashion federal substantive law for breach of contract suits
between employers and unions in industries affecting commerce.0 This con-
flict was resolved by Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills 7 in which
the latter interpretation was adopted.
The impact of the Lincoln Mills decision on the state courts is limited
by the requirement that any right of recovery under section 301 (a) must
rest upon a contract and its asserted violation, 8 and by the fact that
exclusive jurisdiction is given to the National Labor Relations Board over
activities which are protected 9 under section 7 of the Taft-Hartley Act or
which constitute an unfair labor practice' 0 within the meaning of that
act.-" Where the action lies in tort and no comparable remedy is afforded
under the Taft-Hartley or Wagner Acts, the federal courts may not take
jurisdiction.' 2 On the other hand, the states have no jurisdiction in the
area reserved exclusively for the NLRB. 8 Thus, had the union been
engaged in activity either protected or constituting an unfair labor practice,
the California court would have lacked jurisdiction. 14 Since the instant
case involves neither, it raises the question of whether section 301 (a) of
itself deprives the state courts of concurrent jurisdiction of contract disputes
not given exclusively to the NLRB, and, if it does not, whether state courts
5. United Steelworkers, CIO v. Galland-Henning Mfg. Co., 241 F.2d 323, 325
(7th Cir. 1957); International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, AFL v. Jay-Ann
Co., 228 F.2d 632 (5th Cir. 1956); Mercury Oil Refining Co. v. Oil Workers Union,
CIO, 187 F.2d 980, 983 (10th Cir. 1951) (semble).
6. Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, United Elec. Workers, 235 F.2d 298, 300 (2d
Cir. 1956); Local 17, Rock Drilling Union v. Mason & Hanger Co., 217 F.2d 687,
691-92 (2d Cir. 1954); United Elec. Workers v. Oliver Corp., 205 F.2d 376, 384-85
(8th Cir. 1953).
7. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
8. See Sun Shipbuilding & Dry-Dock Co. v. Industrial Union of Marine Workers,
95 F. Supp. 50, 53 (E.D. Pa. 1950); Schattte v. International Alliance of Theatrical
Stage Employees, 84 F. Supp. 669, 672 (S.D. Cal. 1949), affd on other grolulds, 182
F.2d 158 (9th Cir. 1950).
9. The area of protected activity arises out of the statutory right to "self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,"
and also "the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent
that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment .... " 49 STAT. 452 (1935), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1952).
10. 49 STAr. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1952).
11. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 481 (1955) ; Garner v. Team-
sters Union, AFL, 346 U.S. 485 (1953). State courts are precluded from hearing the
case even though the NLRB refuses to take jurisdiction. Guss v. Utah Labor Rela-
tions Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957) (Volume of interstate business did not meet self-
imposed jurisdictional limitations of NLRB.).
12. See Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. International Longshoremen's Union, 282
P.2d 1015, 1023 (Cal. App. 1955).
13. See note 11 supra.
14. This suggestion is discussed in an interesting comment on the instant case in
58 CoLum. L. Rav. 278, 283 (1958).
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are limited to federal substantive law and federal remedies in deciding
these disputes.
It has been suggested that the effect of Lincoln Mills is to preempt the
area of labor contract litigation for the exclusive jurisdiction of the
federal courts in the interests of uniformity.15 In view of the recognized
principle that unless Congress has otherwise provided, an action based on
rights deriving from federal substantive law can be litigated in a state
court,' and the absence of a clearly expressed congressional intent to effect
so radical a change in the existing allocation of jurisdiction within the labor
contract area, this conclusion seems unwarranted. Since Lincoln Mills
did not expressly decide that the state courts must be governed by sub-
stantive federal law, the question of source of law in the state forums
remains theoretically open. It has been argued that section 301(a) might
be read to authorize the elaboration of a federal substantive law in the
federal courts, yet not displace state substantive law in the state
courts.' 7 This result, however, seems inconsistent with the supremacy
clause of the Federal Constitution.' 8 In the Eighty-Second Federalist
Hamilton expressed the view that in instances of concurrent jurisdiction,
''appeal [from the state courts] would certainly lie . . . to the supreme
court of the United States." The obligation upon state courts to enforce
federal law as their own, subject to federal review, was seen as necessary




The proposition that the state courts must apply federal substantive
law raises, but does not conclude, the question of whether they will for
that reason be limited to remedies available in the federal courts. It would
seem implicit in the principle of delegation enunciated in the tenth amend-
15. 30 RocKY MT. L. Rxv. 62, 68 (1957) ; 9 SvAcus. L. Rv. 110, 111-12 (1957).
16. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130 (1876).
17. Note, 57 YALE L.J. 630, 636 n.23 (1948).
18. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2.
19. Tnm FznsaAsIST No. 82 (Hamilton). In spite of considerable resistance to
the doctrine of the supremacy of federal law in the state courts which developed
during the nineteenth century, the Hamiltonian view has prevailed. See Testa v.
Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) ; see also Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal
Law, 54 COLUm. L. REv. 489, 507 (1954); Note, 57 CoLumn. L. REv. 1123, 1132-34
(1957) ; 71 HAiv. L. Rv. 173, 178. This precise situation was anticipated in Cox &
Seidman, Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 HARv. L. REv. 211, 244 (1950):
"Should this view prevail (that Section 301(a) creates substantive rights) the body
of law developed by the federal courts would presumably be controlling not only in
the federal courts but also in local forums."
An acknowledgement of the binding effect of federal law upon state courts arises
by implication from the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Pope &
Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953). In that case a federal court, having
acquired jurisdiction on the "law" and not the "admiralty" side solely by reason of
diversity of citizenship, refused to apply state law in a suit upon a federally created
right. Uniformity of substantive law is required in diversity cases under the rule of
Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). If Pope & Talbot means that the
uniform law is to be of federal making, then perhaps under Erie the state court
would be bound by the federal rule. But see Caldarola v. Eckert, 332 U.S. 155
(1947) (suit for maritime tort in state court governed by state law on responsibility
of agent to maintain vessel in safe condition).
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ment that the state courts retain all powers not withdrawn from them. 20
The Norris-La Guardia Act 21 deprives the federal courts of power to grant
injunctions in labor disputes except under extraordinary circumstances.2
But it speaks in jurisdictional terms, not in terms of litigants' rights, and
only to the federal courts.m  Hence the contention that the Norris-
La Guardia Act limits the remedial powers of the state courts is refuted
by the very words of the statute.
2 4
The question remains whether such restriction of remedy arises by
implication from the proposition that under section 301 (a) of Taft-
Hartley, state courts are bound by federal decisional law. It may be
argued, as did the dissent in the instant case, that such a remedy as the
power to enjoin a strike is more than mere procedure, and that the right
not to be enjoined is a part and parcel of the federal right and hence must
be guaranteed by the state courts. Under this view, the continued
existence of such a disparity of remedies would seem to constitute a
frustration of the purpose imputed to Congress in Lincoln Mills-that of
fostering the development of a uniform decisional standard for labor
contract disputes. On the other hand, it may be argued that diversity of
remedy is not inconsistent with the principles of federalism. 26 Concededly,
the existence of a superior remedy in the state courts may attract litigants
into those forums, thus reducing the opportunities for the federal courts
20. THn FDDA.siTrNo. 82 (Hamilton).
21. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1952).
22. The complaint must allege, inter alia, that: (1) unlawful acts have been
threatened or committed which will be continued unless restrained; (2) substantial
and irreparable injury to complainant's property will follow; (3) greater injury will
be inflicted on the complainant if an injunction is denied than will be inflicted on the
defendant if it is ordered; (4) the complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and
(5) public officers charged with protecting the complainant's property are unable or
unwilling to furnish adequate protection. Also, no injunction may be granted if the
complainant has failed to comply with his own obligations or has failed to make
every reasonable effort to settle the dispute by negotiation or through government
machinery for mediation or arbitration. Ibid.
23. Section 1 of the act reads, "No court of the United States . . . shall have
jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a
case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, except in a strict conformity with
the provisions of this Act ... " 47 STAT. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 101
(1952).
24. Approximately half the states have enacted statutes substantially similar to
the Norris-La Guardia Act, including, as of 1957, Puerto Rico and these tventy-two
states: Arizona, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North
Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. The Louisiana statute has been held unconstitutional. Douglas Pub. Serv.
Corp. v. Gaspard, 225 La. 971, 74 So.2d 182 (1954). However, injunctions have
continued to be available in labor disputes not only in those states without legislation
conforming to the federal model, General Elec. Co. v. United Automobile Workers,
CIO, 93 Ohio App. 139, 153-56, 108 N.E.2d 211, 221 (1952), but also in states in which
the scope of the "Little Norris-La Guardia Act" has been constricted by legislative
provision and judicial construction. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n v. International
Longshoremen's Union, 382 Pa. 326, 115 A.2d 733 (1955); General Bldg. Con-
tractor's Ass'n v. Local Union, 370 Pa. 73, 87 A.2d 250 (1952); Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Bd. v. Local 49, International Brotherhood of Bookbinders, 20 CCH
Lab. Cas. 166484 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1951).
25. Instant case at 338.
26. See HART & WCHsLmR, TH4 FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FwEDRAL SYsTsua
436 (1953).
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to fashion the substantive federal law in the first instance.2 7  But such a
result is not necessarily inconsistent with the achievement of an ultimate
uniformity, since the larger issues will tend to be harmonized upon appeal
into the federal system.28 Moreover, the preservation of local autonomy
insofar as it does not defeat the national purpose is of itself an assumption
of the federal system.29
But beyond this, it may be argued that the congressional purpose is
best served by the preservation intact of the remedial powers of the state
courts. One of the principal ends of the Taft-Hartley Act was the more
effective enforcement of collective bargaining agreements30 Federal courts
have construed the Norris-La Guardia Act as withdrawing from them the
power to grant specific performance of no-strike agreements.31 Whether
or not this construction is correct,3 2 it has operated to impede the accom-
plishment of the congressional purpose in the federal forums. It would
seem unreasonable to impute to the Congress which passed Taft-Hartley
an intent to lay this new impediment upon the state forums as well, in
view of the express policy of the act.P On the contrary, the ability to
exercise the injunctive power in labor contract cases gives the state courts
a unique and positive role in the enforcement of collective bargaining
agreements, wholly consistent with the purposes of Taft-Hartley.
27. It may also have the effect of preventing removal of injunction suits into
the federal courts. See Associated Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers, CIO,
114 F. Supp. 334 (S.D. Cal. 1953) ; Castle & Cooke Terminals v. International Long-
shoremen's Union, 110 F. Supp. 247 (D. Hawaii 1953).
28. See text at note 19 supra.
29. See generally Hart, The Relatinrs Between State and Federal Law, 54
CoLum. L. RPv. 490 (1954).
30. See United States v. Brennan, 134 F. Supp. 42, 48 (D. Minn. 1955). See also
Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§141 (1952).
31. E.g., Bull S.S. Co. v. Seafarer's Union, 250 F.2d 332 (2d Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 26 U.S.L. WExic 3220 (U.S. Jan. 28, 1958) (No. 665). See 33 N.Y.U.
L. Rxv. 225 (1958); see also Copra v. Suro, 236 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1956);
W. L. Mead, Inc. v. Teamsters Union, AFL, 217 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1954).
32. While the broad language of Norris-La Guardia would seem to make its
restrictions applicable where injunction is sought as a contract remedy, the Court has
more than once found implicit exceptions to its scope. The Lincoln Mills decision is
a leading example. In entering a mandatory injunction to compel an employer to
submit to arbitration as provided for in a collective bargaining agreement, the Court
said, "Though a literal reading [of provisions of the Norris-La Guardia Act] might
bring the dispute within the terms of the Act ... we see no justification in policy
for restricting § 301 (a) to damage suits, leaving specific performance of a contract
to arbitrate grievance disputes to the inapposite procedural requirements of that Act."
353 U.S. at 458. See Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind.
R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957), in which the Court sustained a permanent injunction
granted against a strike in violation of the Railway Labor Act. Warren, C.J.,
speaking for the Court, reviewed the origins of the Norris-La Guardia Act and
found it inapplicable where arbitration procedures are supplied by statute.
Lincoln Mills suggests a further possibility. Positing that § 301 of Taft-Hartley
creates mutual rights in employers and unions, it would seem that if the court
can compel an employer to fulfill his contractual obligation to arbitrate, it can
likewise compel a union to do so. Most agreements also obligate the union not to
strike during the life of the contract. Arguably if a federal court cannot compel
abeyance of the strike during compulsory arbitration, the employer is denied the full
benefits of mutuality.
33. See note 30 supra.
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Labor Law-
UNION MAY CAUSE EMPLOYEE DISCHARGE
FOR NON-PAYMENT OF DUES UNDER
DUES STRUCTURE WHICH INCLUDES
DISCOUNT FOR PROMPT PAYMENT
Pursuant to its by-laws and union shop agreement, defendant union
caused a member to be discharged from employment for failure to pay
three dollars dues and one dollar for late payment of dues. Following
a complaint and hearing' the NLRB found in Great Atlantic & Pac.
Tea Co.,2 that the union had engaged in an unfair labor practice under
the Taft-Hartley Act by causing an employer to discharge an employee
denied union membership for reasons other than failure of the employee
to tender "periodic dues . . . uniformly required." 3  Defendant then
amended its by-laws, increasing dues to four dollars and allowing a
one dollar discount for payment within a specified time.4 Subsequently,
another employee was discharged for failure to pay the gross amount.
After another complaint and hearing, the NLRB affirmed, 3-2, the trial
examiner's finding that, while the union had sought in good faith to
conform to the prior decision of the Board, it again had committed an
unfair labor practice. This ruling was based, inter alia, on the ground
that the union's revised dues schedule had precisely the same effect as the
earlier practice which the Board found to be violative of the act.5 The
United States Court of Appeals, considering the Board's petition seeking
enforcement of a cease and desist order, held that the burden of showing
that the one dollar increase did not represent dues was on the complainant
Board. The court then denied the petition on the ground that the record
was barren of evidence to support this burden and concluded that the
procedure adopted by the union was clearly within the definition of
"periodic dues." NLRB v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers' Union,
AFL-CIO, 245 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1957).
1. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 STAT. 146-47
(1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(b), (c) (1952).
2. 110 N.L.R.B. 918 (1954).
3. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 STAT. 142 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2) (1952).
4. Excerpts from the union's by-laws follow. Italics indicate language added by
the amendments, and brackets indicate deleted language. "Section 4 . . .Regular
monthly dues required of all members shall be as follows: . . .Non-Beneficiary
Members, [$3.00] $4.00 per month with discount of $1.00 if paid on or before the last
day of the month in which dues are due....
"Section 8 . . . 1. The current month's dues are payable the first of the month
and may be paid at any time during that month, [or the member will be subject to
$1.00 assessment] to receive the benefits of the discount provided in Section 4 of this
Article. Failure of the member to take advantage of the discount is not to be con-
strued or is not intended as a fine, assessment or penalty.
"2. If the [delinquent] dues [plus the $1.00 assessment] are not paid on or
before the last day of the current month, the members shall be considered delinquent
in his dues payment. If the delinquent dues are not paid on or before the 15th day of
the following month, such delinquent members will then be removed from their job"
[sic]. Bakery & Confectionery Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, 115 N.L.R.B. 1542,
1555 (1956).
5. Bakery & Confectionery Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, supra note 4.
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Section 8(a) (3) of the Labor Management Relations Act allows
agreements between a union and an employer to require, as a condition of
employment, membership in the union on or after thirty days following
the beginning of such employment. Under this section, and agreements
pursuant to it, an employer may discharge an employee for non-membership
in a labor union unless "membership was denied or terminated for reasons
other than failure of the employee to tender periodic dues and initiation fees
uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership.
* ." Section 8(b) (2) declares it to be
"an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents
. . to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against
an employee . . . with respect to whom membership in such organi-
zation has been denied or terminated on some ground other than
failure to tender periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly
required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership." 7
Previous questions which have arisen under these sections include the
legality of firing an employee for non-payment of extra dues levied on mem-
bers who refuse to donate to a fund to support striking brothers,
8 who re-
fuse to picket,9 or who engage in dual unionism.10 The courts have held
without exception that such levies added to the obligations of members are
not "periodic dues . . . uniformly required," but are fines or assessments,
non-payment of which gives the union no right to have employees dis-
charged. These holdings were extended in the A & P case. There the
NLRB held illegal the discharge of an employee for non-payment of a
levy even though the levy was for late payment of dues. To avoid the
result of this line of cases, the union in NLRB v. Electric Auto Lite Co."
purported to raise its dues from $1.50 to $2.00 monthly, and then exonerate
all members who attended union meetings from payment of the additional
fifty cents. Despite the use of this discount procedure, the court on appeal
affirmed a Board holding that the "effect was to fix a penalty upon those
members who did not attend the monthly meetings." 12 In the instant case
the court was faced with the question of whether to extend the conclusion
of the Auto Lite case to situations involving discounts for prompt payment
of dues.
6. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 STAT. 141 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1952). (Emphasis added.)
7. Id. at 141, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2). (Emphasis added.)
8. NLRB v. Die and Tool Makers Lodge No. 113, International Ass'n of Ma-
chinists, AFL, 231 F.2d 298 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956).
9. NLRB v. Eclipse Lumber Co., 199 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1952), 36 A.L.R2d
625 (1954).
10. NLRB v. International Ass'n of Machinists, AFL, 203 F.2d 173 (9th Cir.
1953).
11. 196 F.2d 500 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 823 (1952) ; see also 12 OHio
ST. L.J. 297 (1951) (an analysis of the check-off system as applied to this case).
12. 92 N.L.R.B. 1073, 1074 (1950). Evidence that led the Board to this con-
clusion included a card given to attending members to furnish the basis for their
exemption. This card indicated that a "50-cent assessment" would be levied for non-
attendance. There also was indication that the raising of dues by the local would
have been an ultra vires act.
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The Board's determination in the instant case was based on findings
that the revised practice was instituted only two months after the old
system was declared unlawful, that it had the same effect as the former
procedure, that the percentage of the alleged discount was much higher
than usual business discounts for prompt payment of accounts due, that
the union constitution called those members who did not take advantage of
the discount "delinquent," and that the union did not justify the one
dollar increase as a revenue producing measure.13 The court disposed of
the last of these findings by holding that the Board and not the union had
the burden of showing that the increase did not in fact constitute dues. As
this burden is imposed upon the Board by its own regulations, 14 this ruling
is not open to criticism. 15 The remaining Board determinations were
concerned primarily with the intent of the union in developing the revised
procedure and were ignored by the court which found the record "barren
of evidence" to support the Board. If in reaching this decision the court
was rejecting union intent as a "fact" relevant to a finding' 1 that union
payments were or were not dues, this too was correct. The proscriptions of
the Taft-Hartley Act are not concerned with union intent, and a decision
based primarily upon union intent may lead to a result inconsistent with
the intent of Congress in enacting section 8.17 Thus, in the case of an
imposition of a one thousand dollar initiation fee, although the union's
intent may be to foster nepotism, the unquestioned uniformity of the fee
makes it lawful.'8
In the instant case the uniformity of the fee was questionable since the
effect of the plan was to increase only the payments of tardy members.
The court stated, however, that the union had met the technical requirements
of "periodic dues . . . uniformly required," because the union's plan
came into play every month and affected every member.19 Therefore, it
held that the discharge was not an unfair labor practice. It is submitted
that this was the correct result. Instead of relying upon the form of the
plan, however, a more useful approach would have been to analyze it in
light of the policies of the Taft-Hartley Act generally and section 8 in
particular. One of the fundamental objectives of the Taft-Hartley Act
is the diminution of industrial strife.20 Healthy labor unions are en-
13. Bakery & Confectionery Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, 115 N.L.R.B. 1542-43
(1956).
14. 29 C.F.R. § 101.10(b) (1949) declares, in reference to hearings, that "the
Board's attorney has the burden of proof of violations of section 8 of the National
Labor Relations Act."
15. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
16. The Taft-Hartley Act provides that on a petition to enforce an order, factual
findings of the Board shall be conclusive if they "are supported by substantial evi-
dence on the record considered as a whole." Labor Management Relations Act
(Taft-Hartley Act), 61 STAT. 147-48 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1952).
17. See text at note 21 infra.
18. See Union Starch & Refining Co. v. NLRB, 186 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951).
19. Instant case at 214.
20. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 STAT. 136 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1952).
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couraged, and as a means to this end unions are permitted to charge dues
and to cause non-paying members to be fired. Legislative history indicates
that sections 8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2) were intended to prohibit union in-
sistence on discharge for such things as failure to contribute to a cause
in which the union member did not believe.21 Thus, the framers of the act
apparently intended to give unions the power to coerce their members into
paying dues but did not intend that this coercion should be available to
unions as a means of limiting the personal liberties of their members. The
result in the instant case fulfills this policy of the act since the one dollar
increase had no other effect than to coerce prompt payment of dues.
Further, as pointed out by the NLRB minority, by giving the unions a
method of enforcing dues collections less harsh than causing loss of
employment the discount technique will permit the union to "avoid un-
popularity with the membership and with the employer. . . . The
practical effect of such a procedure may well be a diminution of industrial
strife. . . ." 2 Abuse of the discount procedure, by making such a large
increase that few late payers could make the full payment and then causing
discharge only of those considered undesirable by the union for other
reasons, will be avoided if the ruling of the instant court that such discounts
must be reasonable is strictly adhered to.2
By basing its result on the form which the union dues plan took, the
court leaves in doubt whether the congressional policy behind the Labor
Management Relations Act would be carried out in at least two closely
analogous cases. In a case such as A & P where the union adds a levy for
non-payment of dues strict application of the court's formal requirements
would result in the striking down of the procedure, even though the afore-
discussed policies of the Taft-Hartley Act are met. It is likely, however,
that the question presented by the A & P case will remain moot, as the
instant case provides a court-approved plan which unions may employ to
minimize the possibility of litigation. In a case such as Auto Lite where
the union gives a discount for activity unrelated to the late payment of dues,
the plan comes into play every month and affects every member, as did the
plan in the instant case. Thus, despite the fact that the result of the plan
is to enforce attendance at union meetings, the "technical requirements"
of the Taft-Hartley Act have been fulfilled, and the language of the instant
case would permit the discount to stand. This result can and should be
avoided by restricting any extension of the instant holding to those cases
in which the union dues structure is directed solely to aiding the union to
collect its dues efficiently and without having to resort to the maximum
sanction available.
21. 93 CONG. REc. 4135 (1947). The Record also suggests an intent to avoid
recurrence of instances such as discharge of a union member for testifying in re-
sponse to a court summons. Ibid.
22. Bakery & Confectionery Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, 115 N.L.R.B. 1542,
1548 (1956).
23. Instant case at 214-15.
